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Abstract 
 
Voluntary disclosure theory predicts a negative relation because the information costs could 
be higher when conducting tax avoidance. Reducing tax related disclosures could alleviate the 
concern about whether and how the company has tax avoidance. On the other hand, sociopolitical 
theories suggest a positive relation because firms with higher tax avoidance may want to reduce 
the social concern or legitimize their tax strategy by voluntarily disclosing certain tax information. 
This disclosure could further reduce the concerns when confronting the public pressure or criticism 
of tax avoidance. Therefore, this study examines the relation between tax avoidance and voluntary 
tax disclosure by conducting a content analysis. Using a sample of listed corporations in United 
Kingdom during 2010-2014, I find a positive association between corporate tax avoidance and 
voluntary tax disclosures, consistent with the predictions in socio-political theories. This implies 
that to alleviate the increase in the political and reputation costs induced by public concerns, 
companies voluntarily disclose more tax-related information to meet or alter societal expectations. 
Furthermore, because governments and shareholders have already relied on the tax-related 
information provided from annual reports or tax returns data, companies could voluntarily increase 
more disclosures of soft tax information to prevent regulatory scrutiny. 
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 1. Introduction 
Corporate tax avoidance has increasingly attracted attentions from the practitioners and tax 
authorities because of the changes in rules and in complexity of tax regulations worldwide. Earlier, 
companies tended to seek tax avoidance to reduce tax costs. Investors did not wish for acquiring 
more information as the tax savings could further increase their benefits and tax disclosures might 
trigger tax authorities’ attention. However, since the late 2012, various sources suggest heightened 
public and media interests in tax (PwC 2014; Prime Minister’s Office 2013; OECD 2013). For 
example, tax became one of the central themes of the UK’s presidency of the G8 in 2013. Investors 
accordingly wish to acquire more tax information to know whether the company’s tax planning is 
the same as they wish for. Still, most companies disclose tax information only in annual reports 
following mandatory requirements, such as the disclosures of uncertain tax position under FIN 48 
in the U.S., as well as IAS 12 in Europe. Therefore, little is known about the relation between tax 
avoidance and voluntary tax disclosures.  
Surprisingly, some companies in the United Kingdom disclose tax information in 
sustainability reports or corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports. Not only investors but also 
wider stakeholders there could obtain firms’ tax information from CSR reports not just from 
financial reports. Evidence from Dyreng et al. (2015) shows that public pressure from ActionAid 
International in 2011 affects tax avoidance, suggesting increasing attention on firms’ tax 
information. Different from their focuses on tax behavior, this study focuses on voluntary tax 
disclosures. The tax disclosure issue is not just a simple question in accounting or legislation, but 
the concern of wider stakeholders, including customers, suppliers, and Civil Society Organizations, 
(CSOs) (PwC 2015). More and more stakeholders hope to know more about firms’ tax information 
such as whether and to what extent firms pay fair taxes. Furthermore, CSR reports are still 
voluntary disclosures in the UK, different from the mandatory nature of financial reports, in which 
firms have relatively little discretions. Accordingly, this unique setting provides us with an 
opportunity to explore these rarely investigated tax disclosures, examining the relation between 
tax avoidance and voluntary tax disclosures. 
Specifically, I examine the competing hypotheses whether the relation between tax avoidance 
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and voluntary tax disclosures is consistent with voluntary disclosure theory or socio-political 
theory. The theories predict opposite relations between performance and voluntary disclosures, or 
here tax avoidance and voluntary disclosures. Voluntary disclosure theory states that firms with 
better performance have more voluntary disclosures (Dye, 1985; Verrecchia, 1983). The rationale 
is that superior performers will convey their types by voluntarily disclosing their performance 
based on objective performance indicators, which disclosures are difficult to mimic by inferior 
performers. These inferior firms will remain silent or disclose less of their performance. Applied 
to tax performers, voluntary disclosure theory suggests that firms with less tax avoidance have 
more voluntary disclosures to show their superior tax compliance. However, this equilibrium relies 
on the proprietary costs of the disclosures (Verrecchia, 1983) and uncertainty as to whether the 
disclosure can inform firms’ performance (Dye, 1985). Tax compliance already means that the 
firms would need to pay fair tax that could lower shareholders’ benefits. Because more disclosures 
could trigger more costs or uncertainty from public attention or tax audits, even good tax 
performers would not want the attention from the tax authorities.  
On the other hand, socio-political theory predicts a negative relation between performance 
and voluntary disclosures. This theory actually includes three overlapping theories, political 
economy, legitimacy, and stakeholder theory (Patten 2002). These theories state that social and 
political pressures on corporations are the drivers to social disclosures. Facing more pressures, 
poor performers will increase discretionary disclosures to change stakeholders’ views about their 
actual performance. Applied to tax performers, these theories suggest that a tax-avoiding firm may 
have more discretionary disclosures in legitimizing the tax strategy.  
Overall, these competing theories create tensions about how tax avoidance affects voluntary 
tax disclosures. To examine the association, I use the sample of U.K. public firms from 2010 to 
2014. Voluntary tax disclosures are from those that have tax disclosures in their sustainability 
reports or CSR reports. I further differentiate the tax information into hard information and soft 
information based on GRI guidelines (2015) and tax reports from PwC (2015). Hard information 
refers to the information objective, verifiable, and not easily mimicked, while soft information 
refers to the information subjective, easy to mimic, and not easily verifiable. 
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In terms of research design, I use Tobit regression, because most firms do not have 
discretionary tax disclosures in CSR reports. While U.K. firms are among the first that have tax 
disclosures in reports other than mandatory financial reports, only approximately 14% firm-years 
have the tax disclosures in their standalone CSR reports (120 firm-years out of 842 firm-years). 
Therefore, I use Tobit regression to reduce this left censored problem.  
Furthermore, I use difference in difference design to reduce the concern of endogeneity. 
Especially the effective tax rates are decreasing in the U.K. over time (Ernst & Young 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014)1. I use fiscal year 2013 as a cutoff point to examine whether and to what extent 
pre-attention versus post-attention on tax avoidance affect the U.K. firms voluntary tax disclosures. 
It is because tax avoidance became a central theme in the U.K since late 2012 (PwC 2014; Prime 
Minister’s Office 2013). In early 2013, OECD issued the report of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 
and Confederation of British Industry introduced Transparency and Reporting Principles (Ernst 
Young 2013). Additionally, I create the treatment firms of tax avoidance based on whether their 
effective tax rates are not lower than their peers’ average tax rate in 2010 and 2011 (before the 
attention since late 2012). Then I can test whether the treatment firms (tax-compliance firms) 
change their tax disclosures since 2013 compared with the control firms. 
These results show that tax avoidance is positively associated with voluntary tax soft 
disclosures. These results suggest that firms with lower effective tax rates tend to disclose more to 
legitimize their tax strategies or tax avoidance. Rather than disclosing more hard information, 
disclosing more soft information could reduce the attention from the tax authorities, and thus 
reduce social reputation costs of not paying fair taxes. In the additional test, using propensity score 
matching and difference in difference methods, I find stronger inferences that tax-avoiding firms 
have more tax disclosures after 2013 compared with matched control firms before 2013, no matter 
which type of the disclosures are. Additionally, overall tax disclosures are increasing since 2013. 
I further find that for firms with better CSR performance, the positive impact of tax avoidance is 
smaller on tax disclosures, including hard and soft disclosures. 
 In summary, this paper contributes to the existing literature by using the unique setting of 
voluntary tax disclosures, designing the disclosure indicators based on hard and soft information, 
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and using the difference-in-difference method to examine the impact of tax avoidance on voluntary 
tax disclosures. Existing literature examines tax disclosures in financial statements and the 
disclosures are still unclear (e.g., Blouin et al. 2007). Then some firms disclose more tax 
information in their CSR reports, but why they do so is still unknown. Additionally, most tax 
disclosures in financial statements are mandatory and thus less discretionary. Using voluntary tax 
disclosures in CSR reports or similar disclosures on firms’ web sites allow us to examine the 
theories of discretionary disclosures and socio-politics. Further differentiating information into 
soft and hard would even enhance the reliability of inferences of my findings.  
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Literature Review 
The existing literature indicates that the purpose of corporate voluntary disclosures is to 
reduce information asymmetry, agency costs, or threatened social legitimacy. I develop the 
hypotheses of voluntary tax disclosures based on the three reasons above and two theories, 
voluntary disclosure theory and socio-political theory.  
Information asymmetry and agency costs, these two reasons can explain the prediction based 
on voluntary disclosure theory that good performers have more voluntary disclosures. Good 
performers can signal their types and further reduce the information asymmetry between them and 
investors by disclosing more (Bushman et al. 2004; Healy and Palepu 2001). Disclosing more to 
reduce information asymmetry could even increase firms’ liquidity (Bloomfield and Wilks 2000;) 
and reduce firms’ cost of capital (Francis et al. 2008; Dhaliwal et al. 2011). Additionally, Healy et 
al (1999) indicate that voluntary disclosures could reduce the errors embedded in the wrong 
expectations and revise investors’ expected firm value. In terms of agency problems, good mangers 
disclose more to reduce the agency costs as well (Hossain et al. 1995). However, the ability to 
reduce this information asymmetry or agency costs is based on the assumption that the voluntary 
disclosure can transmit reliable information to the uninformed ones. Otherwise, the information 
asymmetry or agency costs still exist given the disclosures. 
On the other hand, social legitimacy can explain the predictions based on socio-political 
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theory that poor performers would increase their voluntary disclosures to reduce the threatened 
social legitimacy. Prior literature has discussed and defined social legitimacy of a firm as desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions given its activities (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Suchman 1995). When a firm’s culture 
is different from such social values, this firm’s social legitimacy is threatened (Matthews 1993). If 
a firm treats its social legitimacy as a method to obtain operational resources, impairing social 
legitimacy could result in a loss of managers’ jobs (Suchman 1995). Accordingly, firms with 
threatened social legitimacy are more likely to increase their disclosures to achieve the following 
purposes: (1) inform the stakeholders the changes in their performance; (2) change perceptions of 
their performance; (3) reduce public concerns by stressing other accomplishments; and (4) excuse 
their behavior and change public expectations of their performance. For example, in environmental 
studies, socio-political theories predict a negative correlation between firms’ environmental 
performance and their discretionary environmental disclosures (Patten 2000, 2002). In summary, 
socio-political theory suggests the negative relation between performance and voluntary 
disclosures, including the three sub-theories, political economy theory, legitimacy theory, and 
stakeholder theory (Gray et al. 1995, 1996).  
If applying these general theories to tax, how would the theories predict the relation between 
tax avoidance and voluntary disclosures? Tax avoidance is broadly defined as the deduction of 
explicit taxes (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Following the call from Shackelford and Shevlin 
(2001), most literature focuses on the determinants of tax avoidance, but few studies examine the 
consequences of tax avoidance.  
The studies related to the determinants mostly focus on the problems from separation of 
ownership and control, or agency problems (Slemrod 2004; Chen and Chu 2005; and Crocker and 
Slemrod 2005). The agency problems related to tax avoidance include managerial opportunism 
and resource diversion (Kim et al. 2011; Desai and Dharmapala 2009b). As an example, Chen et 
al. (2010) find the differences of non-conforming tax avoidance between family and non-family 
firms, suggesting that family firms probably pay more tax per book income than non-family firms. 
In terms of the incentives to tax avoidance, top executives seem to have a significant effect on tax 
avoidance using both GAAP and cash effective tax rates (Drying et al., 2010).   
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Most studies focusing on the consequences examine the capital market effects of tax 
avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala 2009a; Frischmann et al. 2008; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Kim 
et al. 2011). For example, Desai and Dharmapala (2009a) find that firms with high institutional 
ownership have a stronger positive association between tax avoidance and market-to-book, 
suggesting that the value of corporate tax avoidance depends on the monitoring power of investors, 
consistent with governance differences explaining cross-sectional variation in the consequences of 
tax avoidance. Furthermore, Kim et al. (2011) indicate that tax aggressiveness is positively 
associated with stock crash, suggesting that resource diversion from tax avoidance result in the 
drop of stock price. However, from the view of debt holders, prior research finds that tax savings 
from tax avoidance lower cost of debt capital (Graham and Tucker 2006; Lim 2010).  
Still, tax avoidance has its implicit costs of being audited more or attracting more attention 
from the tax authorities (Kim et al. 2011), as well as explicit tax costs of penalties of interests 
required by the tax authorities (Crocker and Slemrod 2005). The public also considers it unfair if 
a firm does not pay its fair taxes or try to lower down the tax aggressively (Freeman 2003). This 
tax unfairness could result in the concerns from the stakeholders, damages in the firms’ reputation, 
or even the society loss (Slemrod 2004; Williams 2007). In other words, the public could view 
strategies of tax avoidance as a violation of social legitimacy (Christensen and Murphy 2004; 
Landolf and Symons 2008; Lanis and Richardson 2012). To reduce such threatened social 
legitimacy, firms could change its tax disclosures. Existing evidence shows that firms would 
increase the volume of tax disclosures in 10-K but reduce the transparency (Balakrishnan et al. 
2011). However, it is an empirical question how tax avoidance affects voluntary tax disclosures. 
Following the view socio-political theory and voluntary disclosure, I develop the following 
alternative hypothesis 1:   
H1：Tax avoidance is associated with voluntary tax disclosures. 
 
 Following the prediction of socio-political theory, firms with tax avoidance could increase 
the soft disclosures in CSR reports. This type of disclosure is more general and thus would have 
8 
 
no harm even drawing attention from the tax authorities. Additionally, through this self-serving 
disclosure, firms may convince their investors that their tax strategies are legitimate. The 
hypothesis 2a shows:  
H2a：Tax avoidance is positively associated with voluntary disclosures of tax soft 
information.  
 
In contrast to soft disclosures, hard disclosures contain more objective and specific tax 
information, not easily mimicked as well (Yan et al. 2016). Firms disclosing them would probably 
have less fear of drawing attentions from the tax authorities, suggesting that the firms pay fair 
taxes. Therefore, I have the following hypothesis 2b:  
H2b：Tax avoidance is negatively associated with voluntary disclosures of tax hard 
information. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Tax Disclosure Indicator 
This key issue to this research design is to develop an indicator measuring different levels of 
voluntary tax disclosures. No prior tax research develops such measure yet because few companies 
disclose tax information voluntarily until recently. Therefore, I develop the tax disclosure 
indicators based on GRI Guidelines (Global Reporting Initiatives 2015) and Tax Transparency 
Framework by PwC (Packman, 2013, 2014, 2015).  
Specifically, I employ a content analysis that assists us in developing a score for tax disclosure 
levels. By transforming textual data to quantitative data, I could further analyze the association 
between the voluntary tax disclosures and tax avoidance. The analysis of the tax disclosure is based 
on which information it relates to: soft information or hard information. Following the definition 
specified in Clarkson et al. (2008), soft information is subjective, easy to mimic, and not easily 
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verifiable; hard information is objective, verifiable, and not easily mimicked.  
The reason for this distinction is that voluntary disclosures lack relatively strict verification 
compared to mandatory disclosures. Inferences on the voluntary disclosure theories (e.g., 
Verrocchio, 1983; Dye, 1985) require more focus on measures of hard information to verify the 
claims whether to be committed to tax contribution fairly to the society. However, Clarkson et al. 
(2008) indicate that examining socio-political theories requires using soft information as well. 
Therefore, I design indicators and dichotomize them into disclosures of hard versus soft 
information to help us identify which theories (voluntary disclosure theories and socio-political 
theories) apply to these tax disclosures in the CSR reports.  
To obtain discretionary disclosures, I use the tax disclosures in the standalone sustainability 
or CSR reports from GRI Sustainability Disclosure Database and the sustainability section of some 
U.K firms’ websites. Because CSR reports and tax disclosures in CSR reports are both voluntary, 
the data source could provide us with more reliable inferences in further analyses. 
The tax disclosures include six sections, as shown in Table 1. I develop these categories in 
hard information items and soft information items based on Clarkson et al. (2008) and GRI 
reporting guidelines, as well as the scoring system based on Tax Transparency Framework by PwC 
(Packman, 2013, 2014, 2015). The disclosures include five categories, A1-A5. Categories A1, A2, 
and A3-1 show the measures of hard information disclosures; Categories A3-2, A4, and A5 
demonstrate the measures of soft information disclosures. The Cronbach alpha coefficient 
(Cronbach, 1951) is 0.9254, which indicates very high internal reliability for the scale. 
3.1.1 Hard Information Disclosures 
Category A1 contains three indicators for tax governance structure and management systems, 
including attributions of tax responsibility, tax committees, and stakeholder involvements. For 
example, because SABMiller has set up a tax committee, then I give a score to that item2. A2 
emphasizes on firms’ credibility of tax compliance including 7 indicators. These are independent 
verification, participation in tax related organization, relationships with tax authorities, reference 
to GRI guidelines, voluntary endorsement of tax framework or initiatives, professional advisory, 
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and award. As an example, I give a score if a firm discloses that endorses tax principles, statements, 
policies, or proposed legislation from tax authorities, such as the arm’s length principles and the 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project (BEPS)3.   
A3 focuses on tax spending. Because some firms disclose the spending in details but some 
do not, I separate this category into A3-1 in hard information and A3-2 in soft information. A3-1 
focuses on the detailed statement of tax spending, which includes tax distribution by location and 
categories, subsidiaries in tax havens, and tax reconciliation tables. Because these indicators 
include detailed information, such as specific amounts and tax distributions, the tax contributions 
can tell stakeholders whether the firm contributes fair taxes to the society. Disclosing the 
information in the above categories can provide stakeholders with critical information to assess 
the firm’s long-term tax performance and commitments. 
3.1.2 Soft Information Disclosures 
Category A3-2 focuses on general statement of tax spending, in which I cannot easily tell the 
fairness of tax contributions. Specifically, A3-2 includes General Statement of Contributions and 
general disclosures of a firm’s claimed tax incentives. This accounts for the highest percentage of 
the disclosure items, 73.33% of total tax disclosure firm-year observations. Indicators in A4 
measures whether a firm has tax strategy, tax risk management in general, basically all textual 
description. Different from For example, firms disclose broadly that they have a tax policy, that 
management is committed to follow the tax aim of OECD countries, etc. Such disclosures can be 
genuine given specific context, but they can also be deceiving given general descriptions without 
credibility or substantiation, and possibly can be mimicked.4 Finally, A5 assesses the disclosures 
of a firm’s tax profile given the existing tax rules. In summary, items coded here can represent true 
commitment, but firms with no real commitments to reduce aggressive tax avoidance can also 
imitate them. 
 
3.2 Research Model 
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To examine whether tax avoidance is associated with voluntary tax disclosures, I employ the 
following Tobit regression5 controlling for industry and year fixed effects:  
          𝑉𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
                            + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡         (1) 
The dependent variable, a measure of voluntary tax disclosures (VTD), is a score based on a 
content analysis of tax disclosures in CSR reports from fiscal year f 2010 to 2014. To measure 
different information contents of voluntary tax disclosures, I further differentiate this total measure 
score into two alternative measures, disclosures of tax hard information (HSCOR) and tax soft 
information (SSCOR). Detailed measures of the dependent variables are described in Table 1. 
Appendix states the measures and definition of the independent variables. The variable of 
interest is ETR, effective tax rate, a proxy usually used for tax avoidance or tax planning based on 
prior literature (e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). I define tax avoidance broadly as the measures 
in Dyreng et al. (2008, 2010) to encompass the reduction of the firm’s taxes expenses relative to 
its pretax accounting income, GAAP effective tax rate (GAAP ETR). The tax expense includes 
deferred or accrued taxes, and thus this measure helps us capture the management in tax accruals 
as well.6 Furthermore, I exclude the observations with absolute ETRs greater than one, because 
measurement errors would be higher if using the ETR greater than one (Stickney and McGee 1982). 
To control for the effect of negative effective tax rate, I have a dummy variable TAXREF, which is 
equal to one if firm i has tax benefits or rebates. 
The control variables are those proxies for costs and benefits of voluntary disclosures. Costs 
of voluntary disclosures will decrease the desire to have voluntary disclosures, including firm size 
and proprietary costs. On the contrary, benefits of voluntary disclosures will increase the 
propensity to have voluntary disclosures, including firms’ information asymmetry, performance, 
and leverage.  
3.2.1 Benefits of Voluntary Disclosure 
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I use Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ) and stock price volatility (VOLAT) to control for the impact of 
existing information asymmetry on voluntary disclosures. TOBINQ is equal to the summation of 
market value of equity, book value of preferred stock, and book value of debt divided by the book 
value of total assets. The rationale of using TOBINQ is that when firms have larger unbooked 
intangibles, namely larger market value relative to their own book values, investors may have less 
information than the firms’ managers. Information asymmetry is larger in these firms. Through 
voluntary disclosures, firms can reduce their cost of capital (Healy and Palepu 2001). To reduce 
cost of capital from this information asymmetry, firms with larger Tobin’Q would voluntarily 
disclose more. However, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) indicates that firms in the growth stage would have 
fewer resources to voluntarily issue more reports or disclosures. Therefore, I do have expectations 
on the sign of this variable. 
Additionally, following Lim (2001), I use VOLAT to proxy for information asymmetry. 
VOLAT is measured as standard deviation of the monthly stock return for fiscal year t. If investors 
know more about the firm, the expected value from investors will be more similar to the firm value, 
and the firm will have lower stock returns over the year. In other words, firms with higher stock 
volatilities, i.e., higher information asymmetry, would voluntarily disclose more to lower their cost 
of capital. Therefore, I expect the sign of VOLAT is positive. 
For firm performance, I use return on assets (ROA) to proxy for financial performance and 
CSR scores (CSR) to proxy for sustainability performance. ROA is measured by earnings before 
extraordinary items in fiscal year t and tax divided by total assets at the beginning of fiscal year t. 
Prior study indicates that firms with superior earnings performance tend to disclose more to show 
that they belong to the “good” type of firms (Lang and Lundholm 1993). Therefore, I expect the 
sign of ROA is positive. Additionally, following Lys et al. (2015), I calculate CSR as the average 
of environment and social performance scores in fiscal year t from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 
database. 
The measure of leverage (LEV) is equal to a ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the end 
of fiscal year t. Research in disclosures has found that managers disclose more when they have 
more debts, because agency costs of debt are higher for those with more debt ratios in their capital 
13 
 
structure (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976). Also, because debt contracts increase, the demand for 
more monitoring increases as well, and trigger more demand of disclosures (Leftwich et al. 1981). 
Accordingly, I expect LEV is positively related with the propensity of voluntary disclosures. 
3.2.2 Costs of Voluntary Disclosure  
To proxy for size (SIZE), I use natural log of total equity at the end of fiscal year t. The 
rationale is that voluntary disclosures require large production costs, and that the larger the firm, 
the more the resources they have to bear the production costs of disclosures (Lang and Lundholm 
1993; Clarkson et al. 2008). Thus, I expect that SIZE positively affect the propensity of voluntary 
disclosures. 
In terms of proprietary costs, I include industry and year effects, because different industries 
suffer different criticism in their tax strategies, and because over the years the public put more and 
more attention to firms’ taxes. Finally, I adjust standard errors for clustering by firm.  
3.3 Sample Selection 
 The sample includes U.K. public firms over the fiscal years of 2010-2014. Beginning year 
is 2010 because more people start to pay attention to tax transparency (Ernst Young 2013). In 
September 2010, European Commission considered the area of Transparency and Accounting. 
More tax disclosures in the CSR reports started since 2010 as well. The ending year is 2014 
because I collected the data in 2015, in which year not all firms completed their CSR reports yet. 
 Table 2 shows the sample selection criteria. For each firm-year observation, I collect tax 
disclosures in CSR reports from GRI Sustainability Disclosure Database, financial data and stock 
information from Compustat-Global, and CSR performance (including governance, environmental 
and social dimensions) from Thomson Reuters ASSET4. Consistent with prior research (e.g., 
Kubick et al. 2016), I remove firms in regulated industries, including those in the financial and 
utilities industries (those with two-digit SIC codes of 49 and 60-69). Additionally, I delete firms in 
mining industries (those with two-digit SIC codes of 10-14). Because the nature of this industry 
easily results in information asymmetry and corruption, U.K. government has required them to 
prepare for tax reports7. Then their tax reports are not voluntary, so I decide to exclude them out 
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of my sample. To mitigate the influence of outliers, I winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. After further deleting the observations with missing values in necessary 
variables of the main test, these criteria leave us a sample of 842 firm-year observations.  
 In Table 3, Panels A and B demonstrate the sample distribution by year and industry. I have 
similar sample size in each year, but I have more firms in manufacturing and service industries. 
4. Result 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 demonstrates the distribution of tax disclosures and effective tax rates across fiscal 
years. While the whole sample includes 842 firm-years (205 firms), there are only 120 firm-years 
(21 firms) with such disclosures. Table 3 Panel A also demonstrates that tax disclosures are 
increasing over the years no matter which types of tax disclosures, hard or soft. Within the 
disclosure firms, the extent to which levels of disclosures vary a lot among firms. Specifically, 
none get full scores in tax disclosures, and out of total 26 scores, the average is just 5.15. Panel B 
shows that the effective tax rates are decreasing over the years, suggesting that more and more 
U.K. firms have tax avoidance.  
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation of the variables in the main test. 
On average, the sample mean of effective tax rate (ETR) is 22.7%, approximately the same as 
statutory rate in the U.K, suggesting that on average, U.K. firms pay fair taxes to their government. 
However, the standard deviation of ETR is 13.7%, showing that tax compliance still varies among 
firms. In terms of tax disclosures, because most firms do not have such disclosures, the average is 
zero. The average TOBINQ is 1.791, greater than 1, and the standard deviation is 0.978, implying 
that the information asymmetry is quite different among firms. SIZE on average is 7.465, 
representing that the on average, firms’ book value of equity is $1.746 billion. CSR scores have a 
broad range of 0.132 to 0.944 and relatively high variability of 0.226. The mean of TAXREF is 
0.044, meaning that on average only 4% of sample has tax reliefs. 
Panel B in Table 5 shows the correlation matrix for the variables defined in Appendix. 
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Specifically, the significant correlations between the disclosure scores (TSCOR, HSCOR, or 
SSCOR) and SIZE, VOLAT, and CSR, respectively show that larger firms, better CSR firms, and 
firms with higher stock volatility have more tax disclosures, including both types of disclosures 
(hard or soft). 
4.2 Regression Result 
 Table 6 presents the empirical results. I find significantly negative association between 
ETR and TSCOR, supporting hypothesis 1. In addition, I find that ETR is negatively related to soft 
disclosures SSCOR supporting hypothesis 2a. The result suggests that tax avoidance is positively 
associated with soft disclosure, consistent with socio-political theory. Firms with tax avoidance 
may have threatened social legitimacy, and therefore increase its soft disclosure to reduce such 
concerns. If disclosing hard information, tax disclosures may trigger the attention from the tax 
authority. Accordingly, I could not find the relations between tax avoidance and the hard tax 
disclosures to support hypothesis 2b. 
4.3 Additional Test 
 To control for bias selection, I use Heckman’s (1979) two-stage regression analysis. To 
further reduce endogeneity, I employ propensity score matching and difference in difference 
methods to examine the relations between tax avoidance and tax disclosures. First, I create the 
treatment group of tax-avoiding firms, which have effective tax rates lower than its peer industry 
average in year 2010 or year 2011, respectively. Then I use the following probit regression to find 
propensity score matched control sample in the same year: 
 𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
                                        + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (2), 
where Tax_Avoidance is equal to 1 if firm i has effective tax rates lower than its industry peer 
average effective tax rates in year 2010 or 2011, and 0 otherwise; Governance is the governance 
score from ASSET4 database; and all other variables are defined earlier in Appendix. 
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 After I chose the controlled sample firm-years, I use the year of 2013 as a cutoff year, 
because tax avoidance became a central theme in the U.K since late 2012 (PwC 2014; Prime 
Minister’s Office 2013). In early 2013, OECD issued the report of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 
and Confederation of British Industry introduced Transparency and Reporting Principles (Ernst 
Young 2013). Overall, this public pressure could further change tax-avoiding firms’ disclosure 
strategy. Therefore, I design an additional test as the following regression using the propensity 
score matched sample with pre- and post-2013 data: 
 𝑉𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝐷 +  𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2013 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
                    +𝛽5𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡        
                    + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (3), 
where DID is equal to Tax_Avoidance multiplied by POST2013; Tax_Avoidance is equal to 1 if 
firm i has effective tax rates lower than its industry peer average effective tax rates in year 2010 
or 2011, and 0 otherwise; Post2013 is equal to 1 if the year is 2013 or 2014; and all other variables 
are defined earlier in Appendix. 
 Table 7 demonstrates the results that support hypotheses 1 and 2a, consistent with socio-
political theory. This time, the result does not support hypothesis 2b, inconsistent with voluntary 
disclosure theory but consistent with socio-political theory. The results provide stronger inferences 
that on average, tax avoidance significantly affect the increase in tax disclosures since 2013 no 
matter which type of information, whole, hard, or soft.   
I further test the association between cash effective tax rates and tax disclosure, and find 
similar inference as a difference in difference test shown in Panel B of Table 7.  Then I investigate 
whether tax avoidance affects the propensity of tax disclosure, and the result in Panel C shows so. 
Because the tax disclosures are in CSR reports or sustainability section of firms’ websites, to know 
more about the differences of tax disclosures among different CSR performers, I test whether the 
association is different for high CSR performers compared with others using the following 
regression:   
17 
 
    𝑉𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
                     + 𝛽4𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡      
                     + 𝛽8𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                            (4), 
where HIGHCSR is equal to one if firm i’s CSR performance is higher than its industry average 
in year t and zero otherwise; and all other variables are defined in Appendix. 
Panel D shows that on average, the association between ETR and tax disclosures is smaller 
for better CSR performers, no matter which type of disclosures. The results suggest that CSR 
performance mitigates the impact of tax avoidance on tax disclosures.  
5. Conclusion 
I examine the relation between tax avoidance and tax voluntary tax disclosures using the tax 
disclosures in U.K. firms’ CSR reports. The setting and contents allow us to understand the 
disclosures in detail and exclude the impact of mandatory disclosure requirements. Additionally, 
prior literature has evidence on the relation between performance and voluntary disclosures related 
to environment only; evidence on voluntary disclosures based on financial reports could have bias 
because poor performers must discuss material financial information and then have greater 
exposures (Clarkson et al. 2008). Voluntary disclosure theory and socio-political theory also has 
competing hypotheses about the relation, and thus can create a tension that makes this topic worth 
exploring.  
I find that tax avoidance is positively associated with voluntary tax disclosures, consistent 
with the prediction of socio-political theory. Additionally, I find that tax avoidance is significantly 
associated with voluntary disclosures of soft tax information, but do not find the association 
between tax avoidance and voluntary disclosures of hard tax information. These results suggest 
that firms with lower effective tax rates tend to disclose more general information to legitimize 
their tax strategies or tax avoidance. Rather than disclosing more hard information, disclosing more 
soft information could reduce the attention from the tax authorities, and thus reduce social 
reputation costs of not paying fair taxes.  
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I further find stronger inferences using propensity score matching and difference in difference 
methods. Specifically, I find that the positive impact of tax avoidance on tax disclosures is 
increasing since 2013, early that year in which OECD issued the report of Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting and in which Confederation of British Industry introduced Transparency and Reporting 
Principles (Ernst Young 2013). U.K government starts to take this tax issue seriously late 2012, so 
I use 2013 as a tipping point. Tax-avoiding firms increase their tax disclosures since 2013 more 
than the propensity-matched firms. I further find that for firms with better CSR performance, the 
positive impact of tax avoidance is smaller on tax disclosures, including hard and soft disclosures. 
Overall, the results suggest that GRI may need to provide more guidance in the disclosure of 
tax governance. As tax-avoiding firms are disclosing tax information more, proper guidance may 
be required to help the stakeholders understand the disclosures better.  
 
  
19 
 
Appendix - Variable Definition 
Variable Definition and Measure 
Dependent Variable 
VTDi,t = A score of voluntary tax disclosures in the firm i’s CSR report for year 
t: I perform a content analysis using the disclosure index specified in 
Table 1. In total, I use three alternative disclosure scores measured based 
on whole (TSCOR), hard (HSCOR), and soft information (SSCOR), 
respectively, disclosed in firm i’s CSR report of the fiscal year t.  
Main Variable 
ETRi,t = Effective tax rate, a proxy for tax avoidance: It is measured as the amount 
of tax expenses divided by pretax income in fiscal year t, ranging from -1 
to 1.  
Control Variable 
CSRi,t = A score of corporate social responsibility: It is measured by the average 
of environment and social performance scores in fiscal year t from 
ASSET4. 。 
LEVi,t = Leverage: It is measured as a ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the 
end of fiscal year t.  
ROAi,t = Return on assets: It is measured by earnings before extraordinary items 
in fiscal year t and tax divided by total assets at the beginning of fiscal year 
t.  
SIZEi,t = Size: Natural log of total equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
VOLATi,t = The volatility of stock price: It is measured as standard deviation of the 
monthly stock return for fiscal year t.  
TAXREFi,t 
=1 if firm i has tax benefits or tax rebates; otherwise 0.  
TOBINQi,t = Tobin’s Q: The sum of market value of equity, book value of preferred 
stock, and book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. 
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Table 1 Indicators of Voluntary Tax Disclosure in CSR Reports 
Hard Information  
Percentage of Firm-year 
Observations Disclosing 
This Item (%) 
N=842 
Percentage of Firm-year 
Observations with Tax 
Disclosures Disclosing 
This Item (%) 
N=120 
(A1) Governance Structure and Management Systems (Maximum Score: 3) 1.78 12.50 
1. Attribution of Responsibility (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report has 
disclosures of corresponding positions for tax compliance or clear tax 
responsibility attribution; 0 otherwise. 
1.54 10.83 
2. Governance-Tax Committee (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report has 
disclosures of the setup of a tax committee; 0 otherwise.  
0.59 4.17 
3. Stakeholders Involvement (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report has 
disclosures of a tax strategy or tax policy that involves discussions among 
stakeholders; 0 otherwise.  
0.24 1.67 
(A2) Credibility of Tax Compliance (Maximum Score: 7)  6.65 46.67 
1. Independent Verification (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report is verified 
by an independent third party, i.e., tax professionals or a CPA firm; 0 otherwise.  
1.31 9.17 
2. Participation in Related Organizations (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR 
report discloses a participation of tax-related organizations or large-scale 
parliamentary debates that discuss how to improve tax practices; 0 otherwise. 
1.54 10.83 
3. Relationships with Authorities (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report states 
that the company has a cooperative relation with tax authorities, including the 
discussion of tax planning, strategies, risks, and significant transactions, as well 
as how to disclose tax information timely; 0 otherwise. 
4.39 30.83 
4. Reference to GRI (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report discloses tax 
information with a reference to how the company meets GRI sustainable 
reporting guidelines; 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
0.83 5.83 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Hard Information 
Percentage of Firm-year 
Observations Disclosing 
This Item (%) 
N=842 
Percentage of Firm-year 
Observations with Tax 
Disclosures Disclosing 
This Item (%) 
N=120 
5. Voluntary Endorsement of Framework or Initiatives (0-1): The score is 1 if 
the CSR report states that the company endorses tax principles, statements, 
policies, or proposed legislation from tax authorities, such as the arm’s length 
principles and the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project (BEPS); 0 otherwise. 
3.56 25.00 
6. Professional Advisory (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report indicates that 
the company hires professional advisory or technical tax support; 0 otherwise. 
1.07 7.50 
7. Award (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report mentions that the company won 
an award related to its tax compliance or reporting; 0 otherwise. 
0.59 4.17 
(A3-1) Amounts or Distribution of Tax Spending (Maximum Score: 5)  9.03 63.33 
1.Amounts of Contributions (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report discloses the 
amount of tax contributions to governments or the society; 0 otherwise. 
8.79 61.67 
2. Distribution by Region (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report discloses how 
and how much the company contributes its tax to which regions; 0 otherwise. 
1.31 9.17 
3. Distribution by Category (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report discloses 
how and how much the company contributes its tax to which categories or 
products; 0 otherwise. 
2.61 18.33 
4. Tax Incentives-Details (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report discloses which 
tax incentives the company applies for, which tax havens the subsidiaries are 
located in, and what the impacts are; 0 otherwise. 
0.95 6.67 
5. Taxes in Financial Statements (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report 
discloses taxes in the financial statements or in the reconciliation table; 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
 
1.78 12.50 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Soft Information 
Percentage of Firm-year 
Observations Disclosing 
This Item (%) 
N=842 
Percentage of Firm-year 
Observations with Tax 
Disclosures Disclosing 
This Item (%) 
N=120 
(A3-2) General Statement of Tax Spending (Maximum Score: 2) 10.45 73.33 
1. General Statement of Contributions (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report 
discloses that the company committed to comply the laws, complete tax 
requirements, or due consideration of tax to align with corporate and social 
responsibilities; 0 otherwise. 
9.62 67.50 
2. Tax incentives-General Statement of Utilization (0-1): The score is 1 if the 
CSR report has a general disclosures that the company claimed tax incentives to 
reduce tax costs or to maximize shareholders' benefits but not in details; 0 if no 
such a disclosure. 
2.14 15.00 
(A4) Tax Strategy (Maximum Score: 7) 6.06 42.50 
1. Object (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report discloses the company's tax 
strategy or missions; 0 otherwise. 
2.49 17.50 
2. Policy (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report discloses the tax principles or 
policies that the company follow; 0 otherwise. 
3.21 22.50 
3. Governance-General Statement (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report 
discloses the company's tax governance; 0 otherwise.  
2.49 17.50 
4. Governance-Review (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report discloses that the 
company review its tax compliance or governance regularly; 0 otherwise. 
2.14 15.00 
5. Governance-Risk Management (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report 
discloses the company has the conduct or management of tax risk; 0 otherwise.  
2.38 16.67 
6. Transparency-General Statement (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report 
discloses that the company committed to be open and transparent about how it 
operates or comply tax laws; 0 otherwise. 
5.58 39.17 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Soft Information 
Percentage of Firm-year 
Observations Disclosing 
This Item (%) 
N=842 
Percentage of Firm-year 
Observations with Tax 
Disclosures Disclosing 
This Item (%) 
N=120 
7. Training (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report discloses that the company 
has employee training in tax principles; 0 otherwise.  
0.71 5.00 
(A5) Tax Profile (Maximum Score: 2) 9.14 64.17 
1. Compliance-Laws (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report states a fully 
compliance with relevant tax regulations and required reporting; 0 otherwise. 
4.51 31.67 
2. Tax Issues (0-1): The score is 1 if the CSR report discloses that the company 
comply anti-avoidance tax rules; 0 otherwise. 
7.01 49.17 
Note: This table illustrates the observations with the tax disclosure indicators measuring two types of information, hard and soft information. 
Specifically, A1 (governance structures or management systems), A2 (credibility of tax compliance), and A3-1 (amounts or distribution of tax 
spending) belong to hard information; A3-2 (general statement of tax contributions), A4 (tax strategy), and A5 (tax profile) refer to soft 
information. In total, 120 firm-years have tax disclosures in the CSR reports. The third column shows the percentage of observations with such 
specific disclosure out of the total sample (842 firm-year observations). The fourth column shows the percentage of observations with such 
specific disclosure out of the total 120 firm-year with tax disclosures. 
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Table 2 Sample Selection 
 Fiscal Year 
Sample Selection Criteria  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Start：U.K public firms after 
excluding those in financial, utility 
and mining industries  
182 198 201 200 202 983 
Less：       
Effective tax rate outside (-1,1) 10 4 6 6 9 35 
Income less than zero 10 13 16 18 20 77 
Missing observations in necessary 
variables 
3 13 5 3 5 29 
Total 159 168 174 173 168 842 
 
 
Table 3 Sample Distribution  
Panel A：Sample Distribution by Year 
Fiscal Year Sample Observation 
Percentage of Total Observation 
(%) 
2010 159 18.88 
2011 168 19.95 
2012 174 20.67 
2013 173 20.55 
2014 168 19.95 
Total 842 100 
Panel B：Sample Distribution by Industry 
SIC: Two-digits Description Observation 
Percentage of Total 
Observation (%) 
15-17 Construction 62 7.36 
20-39 Manufacturing 325        38.60        
40-49 Transportation & Public Utilities  73         8.67 
50-51 Wholesale Trade 43         5.11 
52-59 Retail Trade 146        17.34 
70-89 Services 193        22.92        
Total  842 100 
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Table 4 Distributions of Tax Disclosures and Tax Avoidance by Year and Categories  
Panel A：Tax Disclosures (N=120) 
 
Disclosure Item 
All (N=120) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max 
2010 (N=17) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max 
2011 (N=19) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max 
2012(N=23) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max  
2013 (N=26) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max  
2014 (N=35) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max 
Hard Information 
(Maximum Score: 15) 
2.18(1.00) 
0-13 
1.65(1.00) 
0-7 
1.95(1.00) 
0-7 
2.35(1.00) 
0-12 
2.38(1.50) 
0-11 
2.31(1.00) 
0-13 
(A1) Governance 
Structure and 
Management Systems 
(Maximum Score: 3) 
0.17(0.00) 
0-2 
0.12(0.00) 
0-1 
0.11(0.00) 
0-1 
0.13(0.00) 
0-2 
0.19(0.00) 
0-2 
0.23(0.00) 
0-2 
(A2) Credibility of Tax 
Compliance (Maximum 
Score: 7) 
0.93(0.00) 0.59(0.00) 0.68(0.00) 1.00(0.00) 1.12(0.50) 1.06(1.00) 
0-6 0-3 0-3 0-5 0-4 0-6 
(A3-1) Amounts or 
Distribution of Tax 
Spending (Maximum 
Score: 5) 
1.08(1.00) 
0-5 
0.94(1.00) 
0-3 
1.16(1.00) 
0-3 
1.22(1.00) 
0-5 
1.08(1.00) 
0-5 
1.03(1.00) 
0-5 
      
Soft Information 
(Maximum Score: 11) 
2.97(2.00) 
0-10 
1.71(1.00) 
0-5 
2.32(1.00) 
0-7 
3.09(2.00) 
1-10 
3.31(2.00) 
1-9 
3.60(3.00) 
1-9 
(A3-2) General 
Statement of Tax 
Spending (Maximum 
Score: 2) 
0.83(1.00) 0.53(1.00) 0.68(1.00) 0.87(1.00) 0.96(1.00) 0.91(1.00) 
0-2 0-1 0-1 0-2 0-2 0-2 
(A4) Tax Strategy 
(Maximum Score: 7) 
1.33(0.00) 
0-7 
0.35(0.00) 
0-3 
0.95(0.00) 
0-5 
1.43(0.00) 
0-7 
1.58(0.00) 
0-6 
1.77(1.00) 
0-6 
(A5) Tax Profile 
(Maximum Score: 2) 
0.82(1.00) 0.82(1.00) 0.68(1.00) 0.78(1.00) 0.77(1.00) 0.94(1.00) 
0-3 0-2 0-2 0-2 0-2 0-3 
      (Continued) 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Panel A：Tax Disclosures (N=120) 
 
Disclosure Item 
All (N=120) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max 
2010 (N=17) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max 
2011 (N=19) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max 
2012(N=23) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max  
2013 (N=26) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max  
2014 (N=35) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max 
Total Disclosure 
(Maximum Score: 26) 
5.15(3.00) 
1-22 
3.35(2.00) 
1-9 
4.26(2.00) 
1-12 
5.43(3.00) 
1-21 
5.69(4.00) 
1-20 
5.91(5.00) 
1-22 
       
Panel B：Tax Avoidance (N=842) 
 
Effective Tax Rate 
All (n=842)  
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max 
2010 (n=159) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max 
2011 (n=168) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max 
2012 (n=174) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max 
2013 (n=173) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max 
2014 (n=168) 
Mean (Median) 
Min-Max 
ETR(%) 22.54(23.38) 24.95(26.09) 22.57(23.77) 22.63(24.03) 22.67(22.57) 19.99(21.68) 
 -100.00－
100.00 
-55.97－93.29 -72.00－100.00 -53.06－79.32 -41.43－79.72 -100.00－90.48 
This table presents descriptive statistics on tax disclosure scores and tax avoidance measure by fiscal year. Descriptive statistics present means (medians) 
and ranges (min–max) below. Panel A presents disclosures scores for firms that chose to provide discretionary disclosures (i.e., “disclosing” firms) on their 
tax performance (N = 120 firm-years). The scale for each category of disclosure items is presented in brackets. Panel B presents tax avoidance measure, 
effective tax rate (ETR) for the full sample (N = 842 firm-years). ETR(%) is the percentage of the amount of tax expenses divided by pretax income in fiscal 
year t.  
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Table 5 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation 
Panel A：Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Min Q1 Median Q75 Max Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variable         
TSCOR 842 0.703 0 0 0 0 14 2.309  
SSCOR 842 0.422 0 0 0 0 9 1.431  
HSCOR 842 0.285 0 0 0 0 6 1.012  
Variable of Interest         
ETR 842 0.227   -0.285  0.179  0.234  0.283  0.750  0.137  
Control-Continuous Variable        
TOBINQ 842 1.791  0.475  1.121  1.505  2.183  5.638  0.978  
VOLAT 842 0.118  0.001  0.003  0.004  0.006  0.834  0.055  
ROA 842 0.083  0.001  0.042  0.069  0.111  0.290  0.059  
LEV 842 0.483  0.111  0.363  0.479  0.593  0.981  0.178  
SIZE 842 7.465  4.676  6.547  7.209  8.208  11.305  1.369  
CSR 842 0.651  0.132  .488  0.702  0.851 0.944 0.226 
Control-Dummy Variable         
TAXREF 842 0.044 0 0 0 0 1 0.205 
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Panel B：Pearson Correlation  
Variable TSCOR SSCOR HSCOR ETR TOBINQ VOLAT ROA LEV SIZE CSR TAXREF 
TSCOR 1.000           
SSCOR 0.966*** 1.000          
HSCOR 0.941*** 0.825*** 1.000         
ETR -0.008 -0.039 0.036 1.000        
TOBINQ -0.037 -0.016 -0.058* 0.087** 1.000       
VOLAT 0.106*** 0.115*** 0.088** 0.001 0.315*** 1.000      
ROA -0.026 -0.016 -0.035 -0.057* 0.705*** 0.291*** 1.000     
LEV 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.039 -0.035 -0.124*** -0.164*** 1.000    
SIZE 0.458*** 0.411*** 0.471*** 0.028 0.065* 0.286*** 0.098*** -0.013 1.000   
CSR 0.259*** 0.246*** 0.248*** 0.025 -0.200*** 0.051 -0.118*** 0.111*** 0.346*** 1.000  
TAXREF -0.018 -0.007 -0.032 -0.584*** -0.082** -0.055 -0.082** -0.031 -0.094*** -0.078** 1.000 
This table presents descriptive and Pearson correlation statistics for variables used in the tests. Statistics are presented for the full sample of 842 firm-years from 2010 to 
2014.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate the influence of outliers. ***, **, * represent significance levels (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
Variable： Definition 
TSCORi,t＝ A score of whole voluntary tax disclosures in the firm i’s CSR report for year t； 
SSCORi,t＝ A score of voluntary tax soft disclosures in the firm i’s CSR report for year t； 
HSCORi,t＝ A score of voluntary tax hard disclosures in the firm i’s CSR report for year t； 
 
ETRi,t＝ Effective tax rate, measured as the amount of tax expenses divided by pretax income in fiscal year t, ranging from -1 to 1； 
TOBINQi,t＝ 
Tobin’s Q, measured as the sum of market value of equity, book value of preferred stock, and book value of debt divided by the book value of total 
assets； 
VOLATi,t＝ Volatility of stock price, measured as standard deviation of the monthly stock return for fiscal year t； 
ROAi,t＝ Return on assets, measured by earnings before extraordinary items in fiscal year t and tax divided by total assets at the beginning of fiscal year t； 
LEVi,t＝ Leverage, measured as a ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the end of fiscal year t ； 
36 
 
SIZEi,t＝ 
 
Size, natural log of total equity at the end of fiscal year t； 
CSRi,t＝ A score of corporate social responsibility: It is measured by the average of environment and social performance scores in fiscal year t from ASSET4； 
TAXREFi,t＝ 1 if firm i has tax benefits or tax rebates; otherwise 0. 
 
37 
 
Table 6 Main Test  
Association of Tax Avoidance (ETR) on Tax Disclosures 
Dependent Variable TSCOR SSCOR HSCOR 
Intercept -38.72*** -24.41*** -21.43*** 
 (-6.73) (-6.52) (-6.70) 
ETR (－) -12.50** -9.059** -4.527 
 (-2.75) (-2.98) (-1.78) 
TOBINQ (±) -0.657 -0.481 -0.0872 
 (-0.77) (-0.84) (-0.15) 
VOLAT (+) 4.874 3.342 2.766 
 (0.46) (0.47) (0.62) 
ROA (+) 3.460 1.786 -11.96 
 (0.25) (0.18) (-1.49) 
LEV (+) 3.542 1.613 3.165 
 (1.10) (0.73) (1.70) 
SIZE (+) 2.983*** 1.871*** 1.731*** 
 (4.92) (4.77) (5.05) 
CSR (+) 15.82*** 10.22*** 7.410*** 
 (5.54) (5.44) (3.98) 
TAXREF (?) -2.889 -2.228 -0.319 
 (-1.23) (-1.44) (-0.26) 
    
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 842 842 842 
Pseudo R2 27.33% 28.81% 37.12% 
Dependent variables are disclosure scores as indicated by the columns. Main Variable is 
GAAP effective tax rate (ETR), measured as tax expenses divided by pretax income. The 
expected signs for the independent variables are presented in parenthesis next to the 
variable. Coefficients are estimated by maximum likelihood of Tobit regressions, and 
standard errors are clustered by at the firm-level. The significance levels are based on t-
statistics (presented in parentheses). All variables are defined in Appendix. ***, **, * 
represent significance levels (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7 Additional Test  
Panel A. Impact of Tax Avoidance (ETR) on Tax Disclosures 
Dependent Variable TSCOR SSCOR HSCOR 
Intercept -41.99*** -25.58*** -22.67*** 
 (-6.53) (-5.07) (-6.42) 
DID (+) 7.633** 4.932** 4.308** 
 (2.83) (2.63) (2.93) 
Tax_Avoidance (+) -1.406 -0.898 -1.074 
 (-1.44) (-1.57) (-1.56) 
Post2013 (+) 9.002** 6.075** 4.327** 
 (3.18) (2.91) (3.08) 
ETR (－) -4.707 -3.571 -3.841 
 (-0.90) (-1.05) (-1.12) 
TOBINQ (±) -3.488** -2.236** -1.657* 
 (-2.95) (-2.81) (-2.26) 
VOLAT (+) 11.43 8.607 5.999 
 (0.94) (1.10) (1.03) 
ROA (+) 26.69 17.23 2.513 
 (1.73) (1.50) (0.29) 
LEV (+) 10.93** 6.350* 4.321 
 (3.13) (2.49) (1.86) 
SIZE (+) 1.941*** 1.140*** 1.217*** 
 (4.49) (4.09) (4.46) 
CSR (+) 16.61*** 10.32*** 8.544*** 
 (5.16) (4.05) (5.41) 
TAXREF (?) -2.637 -1.933 -1.370 
 (-0.87) (-0.97) (-0.97) 
    
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 386 386 386 
Pseudo R2 16.56% 22.59% 17.64% 
Dependent variables are disclosure scores as indicated by the columns. Main Variable is 
DID, Tax_Avoidance multiplies by Post2013. Tax_Avoidance is 1 for the treatment 
group of tax-avoiding firms, and 0 for the propensity score matched control firms. 
Post2013 is one if year is 2013 and 2014, and 0 otherwise. The expected signs for the 
independent variables are presented in parenthesis next to the variable. Coefficients are 
estimated by maximum likelihood of Tobit regressions, and standard errors are clustered by 
at the firm-level. The significance levels are based on t-statistics (presented in parentheses). 
All other variables are defined in Appendix. ***, **, * represent significance levels (two-
tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7 Additional Test (Continued)  
Panel B. Impact of Cash Tax Avoidance on (Cash ETR) on Tax Disclosures  
Dependent Variable TSCOR SSCOR HSCOR 
Intercept -42.63*** -27.02*** -24.63*** 
 (-6.78) (-6.69) (-5.95) 
Cash ETR(－) -8.108* -4.882* -5.412** 
 (-2.43) (-2.30) (-2.91) 
TOBINQ(±) -0.896 -0.617 -0.447 
 (-1.00) (-1.04) (-0.66) 
VOLAT(+) 1.647 1.605 -11.21 
 (0.13) (0.17) (-1.72) 
ROA(+) 1.534 1.805 -0.571 
 (0.15) (0.26) (-0.12) 
LEV(+) 4.129 2.019 3.907 
 (1.20) (0.87) (1.60) 
SIZE(+) 3.300*** 2.036*** 2.007*** 
 (5.11) (5.01) (5.01) 
CSR(+) 0.0773*** 0.0500*** 0.0336*** 
 (4.91) (4.81) (3.62) 
TAXREF(?) 1.533 1.037 1.153 
 (0.62) (0.63) (1.07) 
    
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 764 764 764 
Adj. R2 27.77% 29.12% 38.03% 
Dependent variables are disclosure scores as indicated by the columns. Main Variable is cash 
effective tax rate, measured as cash tax paid divided by pretax income. The expected signs 
for the independent variables are presented in parenthesis next to the variable. Coefficients 
are estimated by maximum likelihood of Tobit regressions, and standard errors are clustered 
by at the firm-level. The significance levels are based on t-statistics (presented in 
parentheses). All other variables are defined in Appendix. ***, **, * represent significance 
levels (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 7 Additional Test (Continued)  
Panel C. Logit Regression  
Dependent Variable DISC DISC_S DISC_H 
Intercept -14.3766*** -13.9269*** -10.3270*** 
 (-5.77) (-5.81) (-7.33) 
Cash ETR(－) -5.3644** -5.2606** -2.5896 
 (-2.36) (-2.29) (-1.10) 
TOBINQ(±) -0.0907 -0.1249 0.0437 
 (-0.26) (-0.36) (0.10) 
VOLAT(+) 0.7426 0.7403 1.9872 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.54) 
ROA(+) 3.7252 2.6545 -6.7358 
 (0.58) (0.39) (-1.06) 
LEV(+) 1.7613 1.3650 -0.0052 
 (1.33) (1.02) (-0.00) 
SIZE(+) 1.1051*** 1.0995*** 0.7456*** 
 (4.08) (4.09) (4.56) 
CSR(+) 0.0315*** 0.0300*** 0.0235*** 
 (5.03) (4.79) (3.74) 
TAXREF(?) -1.7720* -1.8036* -0.5408 
 (-1.73) (-1.77) (-0.56) 
    
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 724 724 724 
Pseudo R2 42.70% 42.40% 35.90% 
Dependent variables are disclosure scores as indicated by the columns. Main Variable is cash effective 
tax rate, measured as cash tax paid divided by pretax income. The expected signs for the independent 
variables are presented in parenthesis next to the variable. Coefficients are estimated by maximum 
likelihood of Tobit regressions, and standard errors are clustered by at the firm-level. The significance 
levels are based on t-statistics (presented in parentheses). All other variables are defined in Appendix. 
***, **, * represent significance levels (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 7 Additional Test (Continued)  
Panel D. Impact of Better CSR Performers’ Tax Avoidance on Tax Disclosures  
 
Dependent Variable TSCOR SSCOR HSCOR 
Intercept -30.206*** -18.723*** -17.543*** 
 (-8.22) (-7.81) (-7.74) 
ETR (－) -26.951*** -18.516*** -11.158*** 
 (-3.90) (-4.06) (-3.17) 
HIGHCSR(+) 0.383 0.275 -0.511 
 (0.25) (0.28) (-0.60) 
ETR × HIGHCSR(?) 19.119*** 12.461*** 9.482*** 
 (2.75) (2.72) (2.61) 
TOBINQ(±) -0.886 -0.612 -0.281 
 (-1.22) (-1.29) (-0.56) 
VOLAT(+) 0.295 0.195 0.084 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.24) 
ROA(+) 9.954 5.986 -9.395 
 (1.01) (0.92) (-1.35) 
LEV(+) 6.921** 3.773** 4.977*** 
 (2.58) (2.14) (2.92) 
SIZE(+) 3.281*** 2.041*** 1.938*** 
 (8.42) (7.99) (7.86) 
TAXREF(?) -4.252* -3.099** -1.084 
 (-1.82) (-2.02) (-0.84) 
    
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 842 842 842 
Adj. R2 26.66% 28.22% 36.59% 
Dependent variables are disclosure scores as indicated by the columns. Main Variable is the 
mediator variable of high CSR performers’ effective tax rate, measured as total tax expenses 
divided by pretax income multiplying the dummy variable HIGHCSR. HIGHCSR is equal to 
one if firm i’s CSR performance is higher than its industry average in year t and zero 
otherwise. The expected signs for the independent variables are presented in parenthesis next 
to the variable. Coefficients are estimated by maximum likelihood of Tobit regressions, and 
standard errors are clustered by at the firm-level. The significance levels are based on t-
statistics (presented in parentheses). All other variables are defined in Appendix. ***, **, * 
represent significance levels (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Footnotes 
1 For the UK firms with taxable income more than 15 million dollars, corporate tax rates are 
28%, 26%, 24%, 23%, and 21% respectively (Ernst & Young 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). 
2 SABMiller’s CSR reports indicate that SABMiller issued its standalone tax report in 2013, Our 
Approach to Tax 2013. Its tax report from sustainability section of its original website states that 
it has the Group Tax Committee that set tax policies and managed tax risks. Now while 
SABMiller was merged by ABInbev in 2016, the tax reports can still be found at http://www.ab-
inbev.com/content/dam/universaltemplate/ab-inbev/investors/sabmiller/reports/our-approach-to-
tax-reports/our-approach-to-tax-report-2013.pdf. 
3 Rio Tinto in its sustainability report in 2014 states that it received Building Public Trust award 
for the transparency of the tax reporting 
(http://www.riotinto.com/sd2014/pdfs/00_sd2014_full.pdf), and its tax report in 2014 specifies 
that it agreed with the primary aims of BEPS 
(http://www.riotinto.com/documents/RT_taxes_paid_in_2014.pdf). 
4 Different from category A4, A1-2 or A1-3 are classified as hard information disclosures 
because they provide specific information about the existence of board committees, the groups, 
the department, or management positions responsible for the tax strategy, tax compliance, or tax 
risk management process. On the contrary, items in A4 are classified as soft information 
disclosures because they contain only general statements or claims without details or 
substantiation. 
5 The value of the dependent variable is left censored at zero, so I employ Tobit regression, 
which provides more accurate estimates than Ordinary Least Squares (Tobin 1958; Lanis and 
Richardson 2012). 
6 I also use cash ETR in the additional tests. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar.  
7 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 2015. EITI Countries. Available online at: 
https://eiti.org/eiti. 
                                                 
